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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of the performance-based compensation system and the
Age-Wage structure which pays lower (higher) compensation than the industry average
during employees’ early (later) service periods. Previous studies show that both
compensation systems have positive effects on firm value. The paper extends the results
and shows the effects of the compensation systems on major factors of firm value. Empirical
results using employee-wage data of Korean firms show that the Age-Wage structure
contributes to firm value through the enhancement of ROA, cost reduction and an
improvement in labor productivity, and the performance-based compensation system
does so through sales growth
Keywords: wage structure, compensation, performance, firm value
Introduction
When there is information asymmetry among agents, the informed party has an
incentive to use the information in the interest of his own at the expense of the
uniformed party. Such behaviors of the informed party in firms generate agency
costs. Previous studies have examined agency costs and related issues. The
issues examined by the previous studies include the relationship among ownership
structure, the agency problem, and firm value [Stulz (1988), Morck, Shleifer and
Vishny (1988), Chen, Carl, Thomas and Steiner (2000), and Fann, Joseph and
Wong (2002)]; the effects of agency costs on financial decisions [Ross (1977),
Grossman and Hart (1982), and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996)]; and the relationship
among executive compensation, corporate governance, and agency costs [Douglas
and Santerre (1990), Kaplan (1994), Byun, Kim and Shin (forthcoming) and Cho
(1988)].
Because behaviors of the informed party may affect firm value negatively,
alleviating such agency costs is an important part of managing firms and maximizing
their value. Various types of incentive or monitoring systems have been used by
firms to provide an appropriate degree of motivation to employees, to minimize
35
ASIA-PACIFIC MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING JOURNAL, VOLUME 2 ISSUE 1, 2007
36
agency costs, and eventually to improve firm value. Among many types of incentive
or monitoring systems, the compensation system has been proved as one of the
most effective incentive systems. Previous studies have examined the effectiveness
of compensation systems on controlling agency costs and improving firm value.
Those studies testify the positive effects of compensation systems on firm value.
But the previous studies fail to show how compensation systems improve firm
value.
This study empirically examines whether two types of compensation systems
can improve firm value, and analyzes how several aspects of firm value are
affected by these compensation systems. Two types of compensation systems
analyzed in this study are: (i) the “Age-Wage” structure, which pays lower
compensation than the industry average during employees’ early service periods
and higher compensation than the industry average during employees’ later service
periods; and (ii) the performance-based compensation system.
An analysis of employee-wage data of Korean firms covering 20 years reveals
that both the Age-Wage structure and the performance-based compensation
system have positive relationships with firm value. The ways in which these two
types of incentive systems improve firm value, however, are not uniform. While
the Age-Wage structure contributes to firm value through the enhancement of
return on assets (ROA), cost reduction, and an improvement in labor productivity,
the performance-based compensation system does so through sales growth. These
results imply that Korean firms use the performance-based compensation system
mainly to increase the size of firms rather than to improve operational efficiency.
This study differs from previous studies in the following way. This study measures
the effectiveness of compensation systems using continuous variables. With the
improved measurement method, this study successfully captures the effects of
compensation systems on the major factors of firm value, while other studies fail
to measure such effects.  By showing the paths of the firm value enhancement
process induced by two compensation systems, this study can contribute to the
microscopic design of optimal monitoring systems.
Theory and Hypotheses
The Age-Wage Structure and Bonding
One way to prevent moral hazard and to guarantee performance is to require
employees to deposit a bond. The bond, which will be forfeited when contracts
are broken, should be large enough to offset the expected gain from cheating.
However it is usually infeasible to obtain a sufficiently large bond from employees
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in practice. An employment contract which replicates the effects of the bond is
the Age-Wage structure contracts as Lazear (1979) and Milgrom and Roberts
(1992) suggest.
A firm that uses the Age-Wage structure pays employees less than the value of
what employees produce in their early employment periods. In their later
employment periods, the firm pays more than the value of what they produce and
what they can be paid elsewhere. The present value of employees’ lifetime earnings
under this compensation structure would not be affected and therefore the value
of this contract to employees would not be diminished. The costs to the firms
would be similarly unaffected. The high wage promised in future years serves as
a bond which can be forfeited in the case of evidence of moral hazard. The
difference between the low wage and the marginal productivity in the early
employment period can be regarded as an insurance premium to ensure honest
working behavior. In addition, the Age-Wage structure will serve a screening
function. If a firm pays wages that are relatively lower (higher) than the market
average in the early (later) stages of employment1, workers who will remain at a
firm for a long time will prefer an employment contract similar to the Age-Wage
structure.
The bonding effects and screening function of the Age-Wage structure will have
a positive impact on the value of a firm. So the following hypothesis is proposed:
H 1-1: The adoption of the Age-Wage structure is positively associated with
firm value.
Because the enhancement of firm value is a very complex process, the effect of
the Age-Wage on firm value would not be uniform to all firms. A firm conducts
various activities, so firm value can be increased through many different paths.
While the issue of whether firm value is affected is important, it is also interesting
to probe what aspects of firm value are affected. The previous studies failed to
capture the effects of specific compensation structures on the aspects of firm
value. This study examines four factors of firm value and proposes the following
hypotheses:
H 1-2: The adoption of the Age-Wage structure is positively associated with
return on investment.
H 1-3: The adoption of the Age-Wage structure is positively associated with
sales increase.
H 1-4: The adoption of the Age-Wage structure is positively associated with
labor productivity.
H 1-5: The adoption of the Age-Wage structure is negatively associated with
expenses.
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The Performance-Based Compensation System
It is well know that the performance-based compensation system is a very
effective incentive system. It has been widely used by various firms and
organizations. It attracts highly-productive employees and provides appropriate
incentives for higher productivity. Performance-based compensation can be of
various types, such as profit sharing, differential incentive systems for different
departments, annual salary systems, and stock option schemes. A compensation
system based on performance evaluation can attract competent applicants, reduce
the number of high-productivity employees seeking early retirement, and induce
workers to increase their efforts while containing problems of moral hazard.
Such a scheme would increase firm value. Hence, the following hypothesis is
proposed:
H 2-1: The adoption of the performance-based compensation is positively
associated with firm value.
Even if the adoption of the performance-based compensation system increases
firm value on average, its effects would not be uniform to all firms. It is well
known that the performance-based compensation system is effective when the
income effect of the employees’ efforts is high, when employees have relatively
low risk-aversion, when performance measurement can be accurately made, and
when the probability of employee productivity improvement is high. Therefore,
such a system cannot be effectively applied to all firms with a certainty of reducing
the risk of moral hazard. Firms for which this system is unsuitable would adopt
systems such as the Age-Wage structure described above or other more traditional
methods such as the direct control system.
To investigate the effect of the performance-based compensation system on various
factors of firm value, this paper proposes the following hypotheses:
H 2-2: The adoption of the performance-based compensation is positively
associated with return on investment.
H 2-3: The adoption of the performance-based compensation is positively
associated with sales increase.
H 2-4: The adoption of the performance-based compensation is positively
associated with labor productivity.
H 2-5: The adoption of the performance-based compensation is negatively
associated with expenses.
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Sample
The Ministry of Labor of Korea surveys labor conditions including wages and
labor hours for 5,400 establishments in Korea every year. The sample firms for
this study were initially drawn from the 1999 and 2000 surveys. From the initial
sample, the following firms were excluded:
• Firms not listed on the Korea Stock Exchange in 1999 and 2000
• Merger firms, financial firms, or firms designated as having stocks of
administrative issue2
• Firms with negative net book values
• Firms for which ownership and accounting data were not available
The second and third criteria were included to ensure homogeneity of the sample
firms and to exclude those that experienced unusual circumstances in their
operations during the sampling period. Based on these criteria, a final sample of
215 firms was selected. The industry distribution is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Industrial Distribution of Sample Firms
Industry Number of Firms
Food, beverages 20
Textiles, apparel 14
Pulp, paper 7
Petroleum, chemicals, rubber 43
Pharmaceuticals 15
Non-metallic minerals 9
Basic metals 11
Machinery & equipment 21
Electronic communication equipment,
electrical machinery, precision machinery 39
Construction 11
Wholesale, retail 8
Service (electricity & gas, transportation,
telecommunication) 12
Fishery, mining 5
Total (13 industries) 215
The wage data3 were obtained from the Survey Reports on Wage Structure of
the Ministry of Labor. The wages used in this study are the fixed monthly salary
and bonus for male workers. Because the difference between male and female
wages and the proportion of female workers vary across the firms, wages for
female workers were excluded from the data. Financial data were obtained from
the “Financial Analysis System (KIS-FAS) Database” of the Korea Information
Service, while shareholding and ownership information were obtained from the
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“Data Analysis Retrieval and Transfer System (DART)” of the Financial
Supervisory Service and the “TS2000 Database” of the Korea Listed Companies
Association.
Research Design
To test Hypothesis 1-1 and Hypothesis 2-1, it is necessary to measure firm value.4
Tobin’s Q was chosen as a proxy for overall firm value and is measured in the
following way:
Tobin’s Q5  =  (Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Debt)
÷ (Book Value of Total Assets)
Other factors affecting firm value also need to be measured. Return on investment
is measured by return on assets; that is, net income divided by average total
assets. Sales increase is measured as the growth rate of sales revenue. The size
of expense is measured as the natural log of the cost of goods sold plus selling
and administrative expenses. Finally, labor productivity is measured as value added
per employee divided by average total assets.
To measure the degree to which the Age-Wage structure is used, wage is regressed
on the length of the service period for which an employee has served in the firm.
If the total compensation over the whole employment period is the same, the
firms adopting the Age-Wage structure would have steeper slope coefficients in
the wage regressions than the industry average. The value of the Age-Wage
structure variable is determined by the difference between a slope coefficient in
an individual firm’s wage regression and a slope coefficient in the industry average
wage regression. Specifically,
AWVAR for firm i  =  ?i - ?j
where ?i is the coefficient in the wage regression of ln(wageiT) = ?i + ?i T + eT
?j is the coefficient in the wage regression of ln(wagejT)= ?j + ?j T + ?T
j is the industry which firm i belongs to
and T is the length of service.
An underlying assumption of measuring the Age-Wage structure in this way is
that the total compensation level over the entire employment period is the same
for all firms, or the total compensation levels are at least in a comparable range.
If the compensation level of a firm is considerably higher than the industry average,
a much steeper slope coefficient in the wage regression does not necessarily
indicate the adoption of the Age-Wage structure. It is possible that a firm pays
high compensation throughout all the employment periods; that is, it may pay
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higher compensation than the industry average during the early periods and even
higher compensation than the industry average during the later periods. Such a
firm would not claim that it uses the Age-Wage structure.
To ensure the compensation levels of the sample firms are within a comparable
range, firms that provide an average pay of 30 percent more or 30 percent less
than the industry average (called “extreme firms”) were excluded from the sample.
By this procedure, 60 firms from the 1999 data and 53 firms from the 2000 data
were excluded.
Another independent variable, PPVAR, is related to the adoption of the
performance-based compensation system. PPVAR is measured by
PPVAR  =  Performance-Related Compensation ÷ Total Compensation
Most firms adopt some form of the performance-based pay system. However,
many of these forms are only nominal and the payments received are regarded
by employees as a portion of their regular salary rather than as a compensation
for good (or bad) performance. To capture the intended incentive effects, “the
performance-based compensation system” in this paper is a generic term that
includes only: (i) compensation systems that involve profit-sharing schemes whose
rules and details are predetermined; and (ii) compensation systems that differentiate
between each individual or each team unit.
Since firm value is possibly influenced by factors other than wage structure and
a compensation system based on performance, we control these factors in the
study. We control firm size and industry since they create different environments
for agency costs and therefore affect firm value. Jensen and Meckling (1976)
and Grossman and Hart (1982) claim that liability provides the source of agency
costs. It is also claimed that high liability tends to induce income-increasing behavior
of management and suppress investment. Therefore, capital structure is another
factor that may affect firm value.
Prior studies such as Jensen et al. (1976) and Morck et al. (1988) investigated the
relationship between agency costs and ownership structure, and documented that
the ownership ratios of specific groups have significant impacts on firm value. To
control these effects, this paper includes in the regression ownership by the largest
shareholder and related parties, institutional ownership, and foreign ownership.
In summary, the following cross-sectional model is used to test the hypotheses:
jt
k
jtkkjtjtjt
jtjtjtjtjt
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where
DEPVAR: dependent variables
Tobin’s Q: (market value of equity + book value of debt) ÷ (book value of
total assets)
ROA: net income divided by average total assets
GROWTH: growth rate of sales revenue
LNEXPENSE: ln (cost of goods sold + selling & administrative expenses)
PRODT: value added per employee divided by average total assets
AWVAR: Age-Wage variable (see above description for details)
PPVAR: performance-related compensation ÷ total compensation
LEVER: total liability divided by total assets
LNSALES: natural log of sales revenue
INSTI: proportion of shares owned by institutional investors
FOREN: proportion of shares owned by foreign investors
OWN: proportion of shares owned by largest shareholders and related
parties
IDUM: industry dummies
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample that includes “extreme
firms” whose average compensation is considerably different from the industry
average. Tobin’s Q is 0.9796 in 1999 and 0.7792 in 2000, implying that the firms
in the sample are undervalued on average, particularly in 2000. The proportion of
firms that adopt performance-based compensation was 24.2 percent in 1999 and
32.1 percent in 2000.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the “adjusted” sample firms that
exclude “extreme firms.” The number of firms in the sample is reduced to 155
for 1999 and 162 for 2000. The average size of the firms, measured by sales
revenue, for the adjusted sample is bigger than the full 1999 sample and the
smaller 2000 sample. This indicates that no systematic shift in firm size occurs
when “extreme firms” are excluded. All the other statistics are also similar to
those shown in Table 2. Hereafter, the results performed with the adjusted sample
that excludes “extreme firms” are reported.6
Table 4 presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the selective variables in
the model. For both 1999 and 2000, Tobin’s Q is significantly positively correlated
with AWVAR, PPVAR, and FOREN. Firm size has statistically significant positive
correlations with leverage, institutional ownership, and foreign ownership.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables for Full Sample
That Includes “Extreme Firms”
Variable 1999 2000Mean Median Std.Dev Mean Median Std.Dev
TobinQ 0.9796 0.8367 0.5413 0.7792 0.7482 0.2539
ROA 0.0270 0.0289 0.0960 0.0297 0.0204 0.1134
GROWTH 0.1055 0.0445 0.3089 0.1348 0.0995 0.2685
LNEXPENSE 19.6503 19.3001 1.5289 19.7486 19.4585 1.5540
PRODT 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004
AWVAR 0.0012 -0.0004 0.0141 0.0022 0.0011 0.0127
PPVAR* 0.0656 0.0000 0.1267 0.0974 0.0000 0.1535
(0.2712) (0.2953) (0.1023) (0.3035) (0.3078) (0.1033)
LEVER 0.5460 0.5585 0.1723 0.5426 0.5480 0.1690
LNSALES 19.7264 19.3768 1.5298 19.8238 19.5354 1.5649
INSTI 0.1105 0.0740 0.1158 0.0885 0.0450 0.1192
FOREN 0.0869 0.0320 0.1289 0.0902 0.0270 0.1481
OWN 0.3453 0.3240 0.1550 0.3657 0.3610 0.1634
Sample size 215 215
* The numbers in parentheses are statistics for the firms with positive PPVAR values.
Definitions of Variables
Tobin’s Q: (market value of equity plus book value of debt) divided by book value of total
assets
ROA: net income divided by average total assets
GROWTH: growth rate of sales revenue
LNEXPENSE: ln (cost of goods sold + selling & administrative expenses)
PRODT: value added per employee divided by average total assets
AWVAR ?i - ?j where ?i is the slope coefficient in the regression of an individual firm’s wage
on length of service, ?j is the slope coefficient in the regression of industry wage on
service length, j is the industry which firm i belongs to, and T is the length of
service
PPVAR: performance-related compensation divided by total compensation
LEVER: total liability divided by total assets
LNSALES: natural log of sales revenue
INSTI: proportion of shares owned by institutional investors’ holdings
FOREN: proportion of shares owned by foreign investors
OWN: proportion of shares owned by largest shareholders and related parties
Leverage is significantly negatively correlated with institutional ownership and
largest shareholder ownership.
Regression Results for Tobin’s Q
The effects of the Age-Wage structure and the performance-based compensation
system on firm value are presented in Table 5. The regression analysis incorporates
the Age-Wage structure, measured as the difference between the coefficient of
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables for Adjusted Sample
That Excludes “Extreme Firms”
Variable
1999 2000
Mean Median Std.Dev Mean Median Std.Dev
TobinQ 0.9582 0.8087 0.5900 0.7797 0.7417 0.2773
ROA 0.0296 0.0280 0.0692 0.0337 0.0222 0.1210
GROWTH 0.0859 0.0325 0.2888 0.1365 0.1020 0.2737
LNEXPENSE 19.7268 19.4135 1.5031 19.7088 19.4683 1.4549
PRODT 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004
AWVAR 0.0023  0.0006 0.0131 0.0021 0.0017 0.0123
PPVAR* 0.0671 0.0000 0.1291 0.0964 0.0000 0.1497
(0.2814) (0.2988) (0.0968) (0.3004) (0.3071) (0.0913)
LEVER 0.5491 0.5505 0.1738 0.5305 0.5315 0.1674
LNSALES 19.8042 19.5056 1.5048 19.7886 19.5532 1.4608
INSTI 0.1021 0.0730 0.1021 0.0861 0.0445 0.1119
FOREN 0.0862 0.0320 0.1289 0.0905 0.0270 0.1433
OWN 0.3452 0.3240 0.1511 0.3743 0.3765 0.1614
Sample size 155 162
* The numbers in parentheses are statistics for the firms with positive PPVAR values.
See Table 2 for definitions of variables.
Table 4: Pearson Correlation Matrix of Variables
Variables TobinQ AWVAR PPVAR LEVER LNSALES INSTI FOREN OWN
TobinQ 1.0 0.246*** 0.185*** 0.065 0.129* 0.010 0.240*** -0.085
AWVAR 0.359*** 1.0 0.130** -0.039 -0.058 0.128* 0.090 -0.045
PPVAR 0.113* 0.087 1.0 -0.099 0.104* 0.037 0.132** -0.001
LEVER -0.010 -0.013 0.020 1.0 0.364*** -0.120* -0.096 -0.080
LNSALES  0.039 -0.070 0.041 0.227*** 1.0 0.242*** 0.399*** 0.100
INSTI  -0.086 -0.083 -0.096 -0.146** 0.273*** 1.0 0.071 0.027
FOREN  0.219*** 0.117* 0.130* -0.100 0.303*** 0.116* 1.0 0.036
OWN -0.053 -0.018 0.054 -0.177** -0.016 -0.131* 0.145** 1.0
The upper-right triangle represents the correlation coefficient for 2000 and the lower-left triangle
represents the correlation coefficient for 1999.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels
respectively.
See Table 2 for definitions of variables.
individual firm wage regression and that of industry wage regression, and the
performance-based compensation system, measured as the ratio of performance-
related compensation to total compensation.
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Table 5: The Effect of the Age-Wage Structure and the Performance-Based
Compensation System on Firm Value
TobinQ = ?0 + ?1AWVAR + ?2PPVAR + ?3LEVER + ?4LNSALES
+ ?5INSTI + ?6FOREN + ?7OWN + ? ?8 IDUM + ?
Variable
Period
1999 2000 Pooled
Intercept 1.394 0.674 1.101
(2.614)*** (1.888)* (3.349)***
AWVAR 11.498 5.311 9.102(4.778)*** (3.121)*** (6.039)***
PPVAR 0.655 0.281 0.340(2.644)** (1.996)** (2.457)**
LEVER 0.282 0.127 0.254(1.346) (0.851) (1.948)*
LNSALES -0.034 0.001 -0.021(-1.245) (0.071) (-1.209)
INSTI 0.001 -0.001 0.001(0.044) (-0.190) (0.021)
FOREN 0.006 0.003 0.005(2.312)** (2.337)** (3.207)***
OWN -0.002 -0.001 -0.002(-1.080) (-0.557) (-1.424)
IDUM Yes Yes Yes
Adj-R2 0.312 0.216 0.264
F-value 4.627*** 3.268*** 6.831***
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels
respectively.
See Table 2 for definitions of variables.
The t-values are in parentheses.
The regression results show that the Age-Wage structure has a significant and
consistent effect on firm value. AWVAR has a significantly positive relationship
with Tobin’s Q at the 1 percent level in 1999 (a coefficient of 11.498 and a t-value
of 4.778), in 2000 (a coefficient of 5.311 and a t-value of 3.121), and in the pooled
period (a coefficient of 9.102 and a t-value of 6.039). This result therefore provides
statistical support for Hypothesis 1-1. As higher compensation than the industry
average in the later stages of employees’ careers plays the role of a bond that
reduces opportunistic behavior, the adoption of the Age-Wage structure reduces
agency costs and increases firm value.
Table 5 also shows the effect of the performance-based compensation system on
firm value. The coefficients of PPVAR are 0.655 with a t-value of 2.644 in 1999,
0.281 with a t-value of 1.996 in 2000, and 0.340 with a t-value of 2.457 in the
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pooled period. All three are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. These
results are consistent with Hypothesis 2-1 that the adoption of the performance-
based compensation system has a positive effect on firm value.
Foreign ownership (FOREN) was found to have a positive relationship with firm
value that is significant at the 1 percent level in the pooled period and the 5
percent level both in 1999 and 2000. The coefficients of OWN – largest shareholder
ownership – are negative in all three periods even though they are not statistically
significant. Recently, there has been much interest in corporate governance in
Korea. Foreign ownership is generally believed to be associated with good
corporate governance because it can provide better monitoring. Ownership by
the largest shareholder and related parties is regarded as a bad signal for corporate
governance for the same logic. The regression results in Table 5 are consistent
with this notion.
F-values are 4.627, 3.268, and 6.831 in 1999, 2000, and the pooled period
respectively. They are all statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Adjusted
R squares are 0.312, 0.216, and 0.264 in 1999, 2000, and the pooled period
respectively. There is no evidence of either autocorrelation or multicollinearity.
The Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.283 and 2.061 in 1999 and 2000 respectively,
and the variation inflation factor is at the 1-2 level.
Overall, the results shown in Table 5 support the proposition that the Age-Wage
structure and the performance-based compensation system are used to control
employee moral hazard and to improve the value of Korean firms.
Regression Results for Return on Assets, Sales Growth, Labor
Productivity, and Expenses
The previous analysis investigated the effects of incentive systems on firm value.
Firm value is determined by many factors and increases in firm value can be
accomplished through different paths. For example, firm value can be increased
by sales increases without changing productivity. Or it can be increased by cost
reduction without increases in sales revenue. To investigate the process of firm
value increase by the two incentive systems, we examine the relationship between
the two incentive systems and four factors which are often associated with firm
value, namely return on assets, sales growth, labor productivity, and expenses.
Four individual regression equations are estimated with each of the four factors
as a dependent variable and the Age-Wage structure and performance-based
compensation system as the independent variables. The results are reported in
Table 6. The reported results are for the pooled period. The result for Tobin’s Q,
which is reported in the far right column of Table 5, is reported again for easy
comparison.
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Table 6: The Effect of the Age-Wage Structure and the Performance-Based
Compensation System on Return on Assets, Sales Growth, Labor
Productivity, and Expenses
Dep Var = ?0 + ?1AWVAR + ?2PPVAR + ?3LEVER + ?4LNSALES
+ ?5INSTI + ?6FOREN + ?7OWN + ? ?8 IDUM + ?
Independent Dependent Variables
Variable TobinQ ROA GROWTH PRODT LNEXPENSE
Intercept 1.101 0.042 -0.001 0.002 0.305(3.349)*** (1.247) (-0.007) (13.216)*** (3.206)***
AWVAR 9.102 0.273 0.400 0.002 -1.163(6.039)*** (1.766)* (0.534) (2.414)** (-3.110)***
PPVAR 0.340 0.001 0.147 0.001 -0.005(2.457)** (0.480) (2.216)** (0.085) (-0.155)
LEVER 0.254 -0.105 0.011 -0.001 0.121(1.948)* (-6.915)*** (0.176) (-4.782)*** (3.897)***
LNSALES -0.021 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.985(-1.209) (0.586) (0.393) (-10.618)*** (193.3)***
INSTI
0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.021) (1.296) (-0.803) (-1.148) (-0.736)
FOREN 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001(3.207)*** (2.039)** (2.754)*** (0.793) (-2.775)***
OWN -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001(-1.424) (0.340) (0.852) (1.063) (0.170)
IDUM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj-R2 0.264 0.257 0.142 0.520 0.996
F-value 6.831*** 6.218*** 3.487*** 17.276*** 3692.6***
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels
respectively.
See Table 2 for definitions of variables.
The t-values are in parentheses.
The coefficient of the Age-Wage structure in the regression of ROA is 0.273
with a t-value of 1.766, which is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
The Age-Wage structure has a positive impact on labor productivity (PRODT)
with a t-value of 2.414, which is significant at the 5 percent level. The impact on
expenses (LNEXPENSE) is significantly negative at the 1 percent level with a t-
value of -3.110. These results support Hypotheses 1-2, 1-4, and 1-5. The Age-
Wage structure, however, does not have a significant impact on sales growth.
The performance-based compensation system has a significant effect on sales
growth (GROWTH). The coefficient is 0.147 with a t-value of 2.216, which is
significant at the 5 percent level. The results support Hypothesis 2-3. The effects
of the performance-based compensation system on the other three factors,
however, are not significant.
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These results shown in Table 6 imply that, while both the Age-Wage structure
and the performance-based compensation system have positive effects on firm
value, they do so through different paths. The empirical results suggest that the
Age-Wage structure accomplishes the expected bonding effects; that is, it reduces
inadequate perks, lowers costs, improves productivity, and eventually enhances
firm value. On the other hand, the empirical results indicate that the incentive
provided by the performance-based compensation system enhance firm value
through sales maximization. These results are consistent with our survey results
that most firms that adopt a performance-based compensation system actually
base performance compensation on sales or net income.
Additional Analyses
Analysis Using The Full Sample That Includes “Extreme Firms”
The previous analysis excluded those firms that paid out wages that were 30
percent more or 30 percent less than the industry average. This procedure was
necessary because the Age-Wage structure is measured by comparing the
regression coefficient in each firm’s wage regression with the regression
coefficient in the industry average wage regression. If the wages of the sample
firms are not in a comparable range, a very steep regression coefficient will not
necessarily mean that the firm adopts an Age-Wage structure. Such a steep
regression coefficient may result because such firms pay high (or low) wages in
the early periods and even higher (or lower) wages than the industry average.
While it seems necessary to ensure that the sample firms’ total compensation
levels are comparable, the procedure and the cut-off of 30 percent are arbitrary
and may introduce selection bias. To see if the previously reported results are
sensitive to the exclusion of “extreme firms,” the same tests were performed
with the full sample that includes “extreme firms.”
The results from the analysis with the full sample are not qualitatively different
from the results with the sample that excluded “extreme firms.”7 The coefficient
of AWVAR in the regression equation for the pooled period with Tobin’s Q as the
dependent variable is 6.195 with a t-value of 5.122, which is statistically significant
at the 1 percent level, and the coefficient of PPVAR is 0.195 with a t-value of
1.667, which is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. These results are
only slightly weaker than those with the sample that excluded “extreme firms.”
When the Age-Wage structure is measured by a continuous variable and the
performance-based compensation system is measured by a dummy variable, the
coefficient of the former is significant at the 1 percent level and the coefficient of
the latter is significant at the 5 percent level. When both the Age-Wage structure
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and the performance-based compensation system are measured by dummy
variables, the coefficient of the performance-based compensation system is
statistically significant, but the coefficient of the Age-Wage structure is not.
The results with the full sample are comparable to those with the sample that
excluded “extreme firms” and are not necessarily weaker, suggesting that the
empirical results of this paper are not driven by the sample selection.
Conclusions
This study examines a relationship between Tobin’s Q which is a proxy for firm
value and two compensation systems. The systems analyzed in the study are the
Age-Wage structure and the performance-based compensation system. Analyses
using data of Korean firms show that both the Age-Wage structure and the
performance-based compensation system are positively associated with firm value.
This means that Korean firms use these incentive mechanisms to control moral
hazard and improve firm value.
The positive relationship between compensation systems and firm value was
successfully examined by previous studies. Even though the compensation systems
positively affect firm value, however, the way they affect firm value may depend
upon firm characteristics. Previous studies could not provide clear explanation
how or through which paths the compensation systems improve firm value. Using
an improved method to measure the degree of using two compensation systems,
this study shows that the Age-Wage structure is positively associated with return
on assets, labor productivity, and expenses, while the performance-based
compensation system is positively associated with sales growth.
Most of previous studies in the area mainly focused on the relationship between
firm value and incentive structures and used compensation data top management.
This paper has extended the findings of these earlier studies by an improved
measurement method and using wage data for all levels of firms.
Notes
1 Paying wages the same level as the worker’s marginal productivity is, on the average, the same
as paying the market average if the workers attracted to each firm have similar productivity.
2 The key criteria for the designation of stocks as administrative issue by the Listing Regulation
42-2 of the Korea Stock Exchange are: (i) cases where the CPA audit opinion on the latest fiscal
year of a listed corporation was qualified due to limits placed on the scope of the audit; (ii)
suspension of business operations; (iii) nonpayment of debt or suspension of transactions
with banks; and (iv) impairment of the capital stock.
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3 This wage data are not in the public domain. Authors obtained special permission to use the
wage data for this study.
4 An alternative approach would be to investigate the effects of wage structures on agency
costs. While several studies have tried to directly measure agency costs, this approach was not
chosen because agency costs could not be measured with sufficient accuracy.
5 Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm divided by the replacement cost
of its total assets. In empirical studies, ratios such as the price earnings ratio or the market-to-
book ratio are usually used as a proxy of Tobin’s Q, since the replacement cost of assets is
difficult to measure accurately [Rindenberg and Ross (1981), and Smith and Watts (1992)]. In
this study, the book value for debt, assets, and the share price at the end of the year were used
for the calculation of Tobin’s Q.
6  When all the analyses were repeated with the full sample that included “extreme firms,” the
results were not qualitatively different from the results reported in this paper. The results are
discussed in a later section of this paper.
7 Detailed results are not reported. They are available from the authors upon request.
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